Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College
Philosophy Faculty Research and Scholarship

Philosophy

2020

How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with
Explanatory Diversity
Collin Rice
Bryn Mawr College, crice3@brynmawr.edu

Yasha Rohwer

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Custom Citation
Rice, Collin and Yasha Rohwer. 2020. "How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with
Explanatory Diversity." Foundations of Science.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College.
https://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs/20
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with Explanatory Diversity

Author Information:
Collin Rice (Corresponding Author)
Bryn Mawr College
Department of Philosophy
101 N. Merion Ave
Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
crice3@brynmawr.edu

Yasha Rohwer
Oregon Institute of Technology
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
3201 Campus Drive
Klamath Falls, OR 97601
yasha.rohwer@oit.edu

1

How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with Explanatory Diversity
Abstract. The concept of explanation is central to scientific practice. However, scientists explain
phenomena in very different ways. That is, there are many different kinds of explanation; e.g.
causal, mechanistic, statistical, or equilibrium explanations. In light of the myriad kinds of
explanation identified in the literature, most philosophers of science have adopted some kind of
explanatory pluralism. While pluralism about explanation seems plausible, it faces a dilemma
(Pincock 2018). Either there is nothing that unifies all instances of scientific explanation that
makes them count as explanations, or there is some set of unifying features, which seems
incompatible with explanatory pluralism. Different philosophers have adopted different horns of
this dilemma. Some argue that no unified account of explanation is possible (Morrison 2015).
Others suggest that there is a set of necessary features that can unify all explanations under a
single account (Potochnik 2017; Reutlinger 2018; Strevens 2008). In this paper, we argue that
none of the features identified by existing accounts of explanation are necessary for all
explanations. However, we argue that a unified account can still be provided that accommodates
pluralism. This can be accomplished, we argue, by reconceiving of scientific explanation as a
cluster concept: there are multiple subsets of features that are sufficient for providing an
explanation, but no single feature is necessary for all explanations. Reconceiving of explanation as
a cluster concept not only accounts for the diversity of kinds of explanations, but also accounts for
the widespread disagreement in the explanation literature and enables explanatory pluralism to
avoid Pincock’s dilemma.

1. Introduction
Despite much attention in the literature, little consensus about the nature of explanation has
emerged. This is because philosophers of science have traditionally focused on attempting to
develop universal accounts of explanation. As Melinda Fagan points out:
Most philosophical discussions of explanation focus on the merits and failings of general
accounts, which aim to cover all cases of explanation across the sciences or within a particular
field (e.g., physics or neuroscience). The different accounts are considered in isolation, or as
opponents. (Fagan 2015, 77)

This approach has led to an ever-expanding list of counterexamples to different universal
accounts of explanation. In response to this plethora of counterexamples, the contemporary
literature regarding scientific explanation has tended to accept that there is a plurality of types of
explanation; e.g. covering law, causal, mechanistic, equilibrium, mathematical, and statistical
explanations. In addition, the term ‘explanation’ is used by scientists to refer to a diverse range
of kinds of explanation provided across different scientific disciplines. As a result, most
philosophers of science working on explanation have adopted some form of explanatory
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pluralism.1 In this paper, we first survey several examples from the explanation literature that
demonstrate that there are multiple different kinds of scientific explanation. While this position is
not particularly novel, the argument is rarely made explicit by defenders of explanatory
pluralism. Moreover, because it is rarely formally presented, it is often unclear just what this
argument for pluralism implies for philosophical investigations of the nature of scientific
explanation. Most importantly, explanatory pluralism faces a dilemma raised by Christopher
Pincock: “The pluralist owes us a discussion of what all explanations have in common and what
nevertheless divides these explanations with this common feature into distinct types. Otherwise
the common feature threatens to unify explanations into a single type and pluralism of any form
is blocked.” (Pincock 2018, 42). In other words, we would like to understand what it is that
makes each of these different kinds of explanations all count as explanations—i.e. we would like
a unified concept of explanation. However, a unified theory that identifies necessary features of
all explanations seems to threaten explanatory pluralism.
Several authors in the explanation literature have adopted one or the other of the horns of
this dilemma. For example, some authors have suggested that we should focus only on
identifying the conditions required for different types of explanation and abandon the quest for a
single unified theory of explanation (Lange 2013; Morrison 2015). For instance, Margaret
Morrison argues that “neither understanding nor explanation is capable of being codified into a
philosophical theory” which is motivated “not only by their susceptibility to counterexamples but
by the daunting task of furnishing a theory of explanation that can account for the causal, the
structural, and the many other forms that scientific explanations can take” (Morrison 2015, 19).
In addition, rather than seeking to provide a unified account of explanation, Marc Lange (2013)
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For example, some authors have focused on identifying distinctive features of particular kinds of explanation
(Ariew et al. 2015; Batterman and Rice 2014; Lange 2012, 2013; Pincock 2012; Rice 2015; Sober 1983).
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argues that there are mathematical and causal explanations that can be distinguished by the scope
of the law(s) invoked in the explanation.2
In contrast, Reutlinger (2016, 2018) adopts the second horn of the dilemma by arguing
that causal and noncausal explanations can be unified under a single theory of explanation
focused on counterfactual dependence.3 That is, Reutlinger argues that providing information
about counterfactual dependencies is the necessary feature that unifies all kinds of explanation—
what he refers to as explanatory monism. As another example, Angela Potochnik (2015, 2017)
argues that equilibrium, structural, and mechanistic explanations can all be unified by the fact
that they provide information about causal patterns. The goal of these approaches is to identify a
set of necessary conditions that unifies all explanations. However, in doing so their accounts
seem incompatible with recognizing genuinely distinct kinds of explanation.
In agreement with those that adopt the first horn of Pincock’s dilemma, we are
sympathetic with the skepticism regarding attempts to provide unified accounts of explanation in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. However, if we abandon the aim of providing an
account of explanation all together, then we will be left without an understanding of why the
concept of explanation plays such a central role in scientific inquiry. Explanation is absolutely
central to scientific theorizing and plays a crucial role in our everyday reasoning. As Wesley
Salmon writes: “Perhaps the most important fruit of modern science is the understanding it
provides of the world in which we live, and of the phenomena that transpire within it. Such
understanding results from our ability to fashion scientific explanations” (Salmon 1984, 259).
We would like some account of what makes certain claims explanatory of the phenomena we
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Similarly, Lange (2012) distinguishes really statistical explanations from causal explanations.
Reutlinger’s view is similar to counterfactual views defended by Rice (2015) and Saatsi and Pexton (2013) that
aim to unify causal and noncausal explanations. However, only Reutlinger argues that a counterfactual account of
explanation can unify all explanations under a single account.
3
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observe. That is, we would like an account that is able to: (1) distinguish explanations from nonexplanations in a principled way, (2) help us understand why explanations are valuable, and (3)
provide normative guidance to scientists who aim to provide explanations.
One might hope that this can be accomplished by adopting the second horn of Pincock’s
dilemma by attempting to identify a set of necessary conditions that all explanations have in
common. However, in this paper, we will argue that none of the features identified by extant
accounts of explanation are necessary for all explanations; i.e. there is no unifying feature that all
explanations have in common that could provide a robust account of explanation. Our argument
for this claim draws from the wealth of counterexamples that have been raised in the explanation
literature to various accounts of explanation. As a result of these counterexamples, we argue that
it is a mistake to think that a unified account of explanation must be provided by identifying
necessary features that all explanations have in common. Therefore, we argue that adopting
either horn of Pincock’s dilemma results in claims that are at odds with the ways that the concept
of explanation is used in science. Scientists routinely refer to very different accounts of
phenomena as explanations, but these explanations are so diverse that there is no necessary
feature that is common to all of them that can distinguish them from nonexplanations.
In response, we argue that a different approach is required that can avoid the horns of
Pincock’s dilemma. In particular, we argue that explanation ought to be thought of as a cluster
concept: it is defined by a list of criteria, such that no one is necessary, but several overlapping
subsets are sufficient for membership. The cluster concept approach to explanation aims to strike
a balance between being particularists about explanation (i.e. every explanation is different) and
the traditional project of identifying conditions that all explanations have in common. Rather
than focusing on identifying necessary features common to all explanations, by focusing on
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various family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1953) between multiple kinds of explanations our
account is able to eschew the rigidity of universal accounts and appreciate the variety of ways
that scientists explain.4 On our account, each instance of explanation will instantiate a sufficient
subset of the cluster of features that unifies the family, but no one property (or subset of
properties) is necessary for membership in the family. One of the primary benefits of this
approach is that we can avoid adopting either horn of Pincock’s dilemma by providing a unified
account that does not depend on necessary conditions for all explanations. Moreover, our
account can make sense of the ongoing disagreement about the concept of explanation in the
philosophy of science literature.
In order to make the case for thinking of explanation as a cluster concept, the following
section surveys various accounts of explanation from the existing literature in order to extract
several overlapping subsets of features that are sufficient for providing an explanation. Then, in
Section 3, we argue that none of the (subsets of) features are necessary conditions for all
explanations. As a result, Section 4 presents our account of explanation as a cluster concept,
shows how the account avoids Pincock’s dilemma, and how our account helps us understand the
persistent disagreement observed in the explanation literature. Finally, Section 5 addresses some
possible objections and distinguishes our view from other pluralist accounts in the literature.

2. The Case for Explanatory Pluralism: Multiple Subsets of Sufficient Features
In this section, we survey a number of different accounts of explanation that have been proposed
in the literature. The diversity of these kinds of explanation provides a clear case for adopting
some kind of explanatory pluralism. Surveying these accounts also allows us to identify several

According to Wittgenstein these family resemblances provide “a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing” (PI 66).
4

6

distinct sets of features that have been taken to be sufficient for providing an explanation. We
will take it for granted that each of these accounts captures at least some features of some
instances of explanation—although the features specified by some of the accounts may not be
sufficient on their own (Bromberger 1966; Gijsbers 2007; Strevens 2008).5 Our survey of the
literature identifies several subsets of features that are sufficient to provide an explanation; e.g.
causal, mechanical, statistical, mathematical, and equilibrium explanations. While our
presentations of each type of account are brief and the compiled list of accounts is certainly not
exhaustive, we think it is unlikely that more detailed descriptions of particular philosophers’
accounts would reveal additional conditions that would be necessary or sufficient for all
explanations.
2.1. Covering-law explanation
According to covering-law accounts, the explanans must contain a set of (true) laws and initial
conditions from which the explanandum can be deduced (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel
1965). For covering-law explanations, the essential features are that the explanation:
(1) Takes the form of an argument
(2) Cites a law of nature
(3) The explanans is true (or accurate)
(4) Makes the explanandum expected
A classic example of a covering-law explanation would be explaining why a particular spoonful
of salt dissolved in water by deducing this fact from the general law that “all salt dissolves in
water” and the particular conditions of the salt being placed in the water. Although this account
has been extremely influential, several counterexamples have shown that these conditions are not

For example, there are compelling counterexamples that seem to show that Hempel’s covering law and
unificationist accounts are insufficient on their own.
5
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sufficient to provide an explanation; e.g. the flagpole case and hexed-salt case (Bromberger
1966; Salmon 1984). In response, most philosophers have argued that the flagpole can explain its
shadow and the chemical properties of salt explain its dissolving because these explanations
meet one of the sufficient subsets of conditions listed below; e.g. they both provide causal
explanations.
2.2. Causal explanation
Generally, according to the causal approach, what explains an event is the event’s causal
history—i.e. the actual causal relationships that produced the explanandum (Salmon, 1984, 1994,
1997).6 Most causal accounts also involve a temporal component in that a cause must precede its
effects. Contemporary theories of causal explanation include Michael Strevens’s (2004, 2008)
kairetic account, James Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account, and Angela Potochnik’s
(2017) causal pattern account. For causal accounts the key features of an explanation are:
(1) Describes the relevant causes of the explanandum
(2) Provides an accurate description of those relevant causes (i.e. the explanans is true)
(3) Provides information about counterfactual dependence (about how changing the relevant
causes would influence the explanandum)
(4) Describes a temporal order of events in the sense that the explanans must occur before
the explanandum7
As an example of a causal explanation, ecologists might cite the introduction of a particular
species as the cause of the extinction of another species. For instance, explaining the extinction
of nine of the twelve native bird species of Guam by citing the unintentional introduction of the
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In addition, the CM-model was originally proposed by Salmon in 1984, but is similar to the account outlined by
David Lewis in his Causal Explanation (Lewis 1986) and more contemporary process theories (Dowe 2007).
7
While this condition is emphasized by process and mechanistic accounts, it is also present in any causal account
that requires causes to precede their effects.
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brown tree snake (and there being no natural predators of those snakes on the island) (Wright
2008). This explanation accurately describes a previous cause of the event that, if it had not been
present (and everything else was held fixed), the explanandum would not have occurred.
2.3. Mechanistic explanation
Mechanistic explanations provide explanations by describing the components, interactions, and
processes that produce or give rise to the explanandum. In particular, mechanistic explanations
focus on the following features (e.g. Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Craver 2006, 2007; Craver
and Darden 2013; Glennan 2017; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Machamer, Darden, and Craver
2000):
(1) Describes the relevant causes of the explanandum
(2) Cites the organization of the parts of the system
(3) Describes a temporal process that unfolds from start-up to termination conditions
(4) The explanans must be true (or accurate)
(5) Provides information about counterfactual dependence (about what would happen if the
parts, interactions, or initial conditions had been different)
For example, an engineer might explain the motion of a bicycle by citing the temporal processes
that unfold in the mechanism(s) that relates the various parts of the bike’s drivetrain (Glennan
2017). Such a mechanistic explanation might describe the detailed steps for how the crankset
drives the freewheel via the chain.
2.4. Unificationist explanation
The central idea behind the unification approach is that explanation is a matter of providing a
unified account of a wide range of different phenomena (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981; Kitcher
1989). The features emphasized by unificationist theories are:
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(1) Connects disparate phenomena
(2) Is general
(3) Appeals to laws or sufficiently invariant generalizations
(4) The explanans must be true (or accurate)
For example, the theory of evolution explains the diversity of forms of life found on earth by
citing the generally applicable pattern of natural selection (Kitcher 1981). While some
unificationist accounts also include providing a deductive argument that entails the conclusion
(Kitcher 1981), not all unificationist accounts include this feature. Furthermore, some
philosophers have argued that this set of features is not sufficient to provide an explanation on its
own (Gijsbers 2007). While these features may not be sufficient on their own to provide an
explanation, the features of unificationist accounts have been extremely influential for many
contemporary accounts of explanation (e.g. Potochnik 2017; Strevens 2004, 2008; Woodward
2003).
2.5. Equilibrium explanation
In cases of equilibrium explanation, the final state of a system is explained by showing that it is
the system’s equilibrium state (Potochnik 2007, 2017; Rice 2012, 2015; Sober 1983). These
explanations emphasize the following features:
(1) Makes the explanandum expected
(2) Appeals to structural features (e.g. constraints and tradeoffs) of the overall system
(3) Provides information about counterfactual dependence
For example, many philosophers discuss Fisher’s use of an equilibrium model to explain the
ubiquity of the 1:1 sex ratio (Maynard Smith 1982; Potochnik 2017; Rice 2015; Sober 1983). In
this case, Fisher argues that anytime one sex is in the minority, offspring of the minority sex will
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have a fitness advantage due to increased mating opportunities. As a result of this structural
feature of the overall system, the system will eventually move to a 1:1 equilibrium sex ratio.
2.6. Mathematical explanation
In addition, many authors have argued that there are distinctively mathematical explanations
(Baker 2009; Lange 2012; Pincock 2012). These accounts emphasize the following features:
(1) Appeals to mathematical facts
(2) The explanans is true (or accurate)
(3) Provides information about counterfactual dependence (e.g. about how changing the
mathematical facts would change the explanandum)
For example, we can explain why it is impossible for Mother to divide 23 strawberries evenly
among her five children by appealing to the mathematical fact that 23 does not divide evenly by
five (Lange 2012).
2.7. Statistical explanation
Another kind of explanation involves appealing to statistical properties of a system (Ariew, Rice
and Rohwer 2015, 2017; Lange 2013; Matthen and Ariew 2009; Walsh et al. 2002; Walsh 2007,
2010). Such statistical explanations often involve deduction from laws that govern statistical
distributions—e.g. the law of deviation. A statistical explanation:
(1) Cites statistical features of the population
(2) Cites statistical laws
(3) Provides information about counterfactual dependence (e.g. about what would occur if
the statistical features of the population had been different)
As an example, several accounts discuss Francis Galton’s use of statistical regression to explain
the stability of the distribution of character traits (e.g. height) across generations of a population
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(Ariew et al. 2015). Galton used the statistical law of deviation to derive that if a population were
normal distributed in the initial generation, then the next generation would also display a normal
distribution.
This survey does not exhaust all potential accounts of explanation, but we think it
captures several of the most influential ones. What the above accounts show is that philosophers
have already done a fairly decent job of identifying a range of subsets of features, many of which
are sufficient for explanation; e.g. causal, mechanical, equilibrium, mathematical, or statistical
explanations. A satisfactory account of explanation must account for this diversity of kinds of
explanation found in science.8

3. None of These Features Are Necessary for Explanation
The most common response at this point has been for philosophers of science to try to identify a
set of features that are necessary for each of the various kinds of explanation. The hope is that
identifying these necessary features will enable us to provide a unified account of explanation
that can subsume the diverse types of explanation found in science. In contrast to this approach,
we argue that none of the features identified by these accounts of explanation are necessary
conditions. To begin, we assume that any feature that shows up on only one of the lists above is
not necessary for all explanations since there are clearly other kinds of explanation that do not
require that feature. This rules out the following features as necessary conditions:
(1) Takes the form of an argument
(2) Cites the organization of parts of the system
(3) Appeals to a mathematical fact

8

For our purposes here, we will not be defending accounts of any of the particular kinds of explanation identified
here. We only assume that some of these lists of features are sufficient to explain.
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(4) Cites statistical features of the population
(5) Is general
(6) Connects disparate phenomena
(7) Appeals to structural features of the overall system
The remaining features that occur on more than one list are the following:
(1) Provides information about counterfactual dependence
(2) Cites causes of the explanandum
(3) Describes a temporal order of events
(4) Cites a law
(5) Makes the explanandum expected
(6) The explanans is true or accurate
In the rest of this section we will argue that, while they are common features of many
explanations (i.e. they are resemblances among members of the family), none of these features
are necessary conditions for all explanations.
To begin, providing information about counterfactual dependence is found across
numerous kinds of explanation (Bokulich 2011; Reutlinger 2018; Rice 2015; Woodward 2003).
However, there are a few instances in which an explanation can be given where information
about counterfactual dependence is not necessary. Specifically, we have in mind certain cases of
preemption or overdetermination where the explanation cites a cause of the explanandum, but the
explanandum does not counterfactually depend on that cause because, if the cause had not
occurred, another cause would have made the explanandum happen anyway. For example, if a
teacher wants to explain why the classroom window is broken, for purposes of assigning blame,
she can cite the fact that Julie threw a rock at the window as the explanation. However, if Julie
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had not thrown the rock, then the window still would have broken since Michael also threw a
rock at the window that arrived shortly after Julie’s. In this case, the teacher’s explanation is
sufficient for her purposes in virtue of citing the actual cause of the explanandum, but the
explanation does not cite any features on which the explanandum counterfactually depends. As a
result, this kind of case illustrates that information about counterfactual dependence is not
necessary to provide an explanation.
A defender of the necessity of counterfactual dependence for explanation might respond
that while the statement ‘Julie threw a rock’ does not cite a feature on which the explanandum
counterfactually depends, there is a larger network of counterfactual relations that includes the
counterfactual dependence between the fact that ‘someone threw a rock’ and the explanandum
and this larger network must be cited in order to adequately explain. However, while there
certainly is a counterfactual dependence explanation that might cite someone’s throwing a rock
as the reason for the window’s breaking, the teacher’s original explanation that only cites Julie’s
rock as the cause of the window’s breaking seems sufficient without having to include this
further information about counterfactual dependence. Moreover, certain contexts in which this
kind of explanation might be sought—e.g. a teacher wanting to know who broke the window—
would require that the explanation be more specific than merely citing the generic counterfactual
dependence between someone’s throwing a rock and the window’s breaking. Indeed, what the
context seems to require is that the explanation cite the specific cause of the window’s breaking
(Julie’s throwing of the rock) on which the explanandum does not counterfactually depend.
Woodward argues that cases of preemption are not problematic for his interventionist
view of explanation since everyone will agree about what the relevant counterfactuals are in
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these kinds of cases (Woodward 2003, 85-86).9 In order to argue for this point, Woodward
discusses a slightly different kind of case in which, had the first cause not occurred, then the
second cause would have occurred (but the second cause did not occur in the actual case).
Woodward then suggests that if we hold fixed the actual situation, in which the second cause
fails to occur, then the effect does counterfactually depend on the occurrence of the first cause
(Woodward 2003, 86). However, the case described above is importantly different. In particular,
in the case described above both of the (potential) causes of the event occur. As a result, if we
hold fixed the actual situation in which Michael throws a rock, then the window’s breakings does
not counterfactually depend on Julie’s throwing of a rock.
In addition, we agree with Woodward that we can all agree what the counterfactual
dependence relations would be in these cases if they were represented by an idealized causal
model. However, given the context of the explanation in which a teacher wants to know who
broke the classroom window for purposes of assigning blame, it appears that the teacher only
needs to cite that Julie’s rock broke the window in order to explain—even if the teacher is
completely ignorant of the counterfactual dependencies that might hold in an idealized causal
model (Woodward 2003, 85).10 In short, the teacher does not need to cite any counterfactual
dependencies; her explanation is sufficient despite citing a feature on which the explanandum
does not counterfactually depend in the actual case. This is similar to several cases described by
Khalifa et al. (forthcoming) in which one can find some kind of counterfactual dependence, but
that counterfactual information is ‘incidental’ to the actual explanation—i.e. the explanation can

9

Somewhat similarly, Lewis (2000) argues that preemption cases can be captured by counterfactual accounts (of
causation) by suggesting that there will counterfactual dependencies between certain whether, when and how the
cause occurs and whether, when and how the effect occurs. This might be so even if some of those changes to the
cause fail to change the occurrence of the effect.
10
What is more, assuming that Michael does not throw a rock in order to evaluate the counterfactual relations
between Julie’s throwing a rock and the breaking of the window just removes the preemption from the scenario in
order to establish a counterfactual dependence between Julie’s throwing the rock and the window breaking.

15

be provided independent of that counterfactual dependence. In other words, even though there
might be some truths about counterfactual dependencies in every case, it does not follow that it is
necessary to cite those counterfactual dependencies in order to provide an explanation.11 We
argue that the preemption case above shows that, in at least some cases, citing a relationship of
counterfactual dependence is not necessary to explain.
Next, the citing of causes to explain is widespread in science. However, there are several
instances of noncausal explanation that have been analyzed in the literature in which a causal
interpretation of the explanatory variables is inappropriate. For example, mathematical properties
(Pincock 2012), statistical properties (Ariew et al. 2015, Lange 2012, 2013; Walsh et al. 2002),
or tradeoffs among structural features (Rice 2012, 2015) can all be used to explain without
having to cite the causes of the explanandum. As an example, consider again the explanation for
why it is impossible for Mother to divide 23 strawberries evenly among her five children. This
explanation cites only mathematical facts about the indivisibility of 23 by 5 without citing any
causes of the explanandum (Lange 2012).12 Consequently, assuming that at least one of these
noncausal cases is a genuine instance of explanation, citing causes is not necessary to provide an
explanation.
In addition, while most causal and mechanistic explanations cite a temporal order of
events in which the causes precede the effects, some explanations lack this temporal feature and
instead explain things synchronically (Pincock 2012; Rice 2012).13 For example, mathematical
explanations of why it is impossible to cross all the bridges of Köningsberg only once without
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Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to make this line of argument more explicit.
It is also worth noting that, similar to our response to the preemption cases above, Lange (2012) argues that
although there is causal information available in this case, that causal information is incidental to the explanation.
13
It is worth noting that at least some mechanistic explanations are constitutive explanations that seem to be
synchronic rather than diachronic (Craver 2006). However, as we will argue below, we think this is just further
evidence that citing a temporal order of events is not necessary for all explanations. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for bringing this other kind of synchronic explanation to our attention.
12
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crossing the same bridge twice need only cite the fact that the bridges form a non-Eulerian graph
(Pincock 2012). As Pincock notes, “it seems clear that our representation of the bridges is not a
causal representation for the simple reason that it does not represent change over time” (Pincock
2012, 53). Therefore, citing a temporal ordering of events is likewise not necessary to explain.
The next feature of many explanations is the citing of laws. However, as much of the
literature in philosophy of biology and philosophy of the social sciences has shown, there are
large parts of science that do not have laws—or at least are able to explain without having to cite
laws. While many explanations appeal to generalizations, it seems clear that these
generalizations need not count as laws of nature (however they are defined) in order to provide
an explanation. As a result, citing a law of nature is not necessary for all explanations.
Another feature that many accounts appeal to is the fact that the explanans makes the
explanandum expected (Batterman 2002; Hempel 1965; Rice 2015). However, there are many
cases in which a sufficient explanation is provided for a highly improbable event. When this
happens, the explanans shows that the phenomenon was unexpected because it was highly
unlikely. However, the explanans can still show why the phenomenon occurred even if it was
improbable. For example, we can explain a run of 100 heads in a series of coin flips by citing the
propensity of the fair coin even though that explanation shows why the explanandum is
improbable or unexpected.
Finally, almost all accounts of explanation suggest that the explanans must be true or
accurate. For example, Hempel required the premises of the explanatory argument to be true and
most causal accounts (e.g. Strevens 2008) require the explanation to accurately describe (or
represent) the relevant causes of the explanandum. Hence it has been suggested that the
explanatorily relevant features must be accurately described by the propositions or
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representations included in the explanans. However, several recent accounts of how highly
idealized models explain allow models that include essential idealizations (i.e. ineliminable false
assumptions) to provide sufficient explanations (Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014;
Bokulich 2011, 2012; Morrison 2009, 2015; Rohwer and Rice 2016; Rice 2015, 2017). For
example, physicists use the lattice gas automaton (LGA) model as part of the explanation of the
universal macroscale behaviors of fluids despite the model being a caricature of any real fluid
(Batterman and Rice 2014). The model misrepresents fluids as discrete systems composed of
point particles that only interact according to a simple computational algorithm. Moreover, the
explanation of the universality of these patterns of fluid flow makes use of renormalization group
techniques that require an essential idealization known as the thermodynamic limit: the limit in
which the number of particles in the system goes to infinity (Batterman 2002; Batterman and
Rice 2014).14 Without this idealization, the mathematical representations appealed to in the
explanation do not display the kinds of behaviors (e.g. phase transitions) physicists are interested
in explaining (Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014; Morrison 2015). As Margaret
Morrison explains:
The occurrence of phase transitions requires a mathematical technique known as taking the
‘thermodynamic limit,’ N→∞; in other words we need to assume that a system contains an infinite
number of particles in order to understand the behavior of a real, finite system…[since] the
assumption that the system is infinite is necessary for the symmetry breaking associated with
phase transitions to occur. In other words, we have a description of a physically unrealizable
situation (an infinite system) that is required to explain a physically realizable phenomenon (the
occurrence of phase transitions). (Morrison 2009, 128).15

While Lange (2014) and Povich (2018) have raised various objections to Batterman and Rice’s (2014) account of
minimal model explanations, they do not disagree with the claim that the explanation that appeals to renormalization
requires the thermodynamic limit. While we disagree with many of the criticisms raised by those authors, we don’t
think this paper would be well served by getting into a more detailed debate about how minimal model explanations
work given that all parties agree to the essential use of idealizations in these explanations. Indeed, the essential use
of idealizations within explanations has been widely adopted by many authors who have focused on cases besides
minimal model explanations (e.g. see Batterman 2002; Morrison 2015; or Wayne 2011). Our point here isn’t that
these explanations provide no accurate information, but that they necessarily require a falsehood. As a result, we use
the example to show that being completely true/accurate is not a necessary condition for all explanations.
15
Or as physicist Leo Kadanoff (2000) puts it, “The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No
phase transitions occur in systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom” (238).
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In short, these explanations in physics distort many of the difference-making features of real
fluids and depend in essential ways on idealized limits (that cannot be true in the actual case). If
these cases of essential idealizations provide sufficient explanations—which many philosophers
and physicists argue that they do—then complete truth or accurate representation within the
explanans is not necessary for explanation either.16
We have now argued that none of the features identified by the most prominent accounts
of explanation are necessary conditions. Once we recognize this fact, we can see why the
explanation literature is filled with an ever-expanding list of counterexamples to accounts of
explanation that claim a particular subset of conditions is sufficient and necessary to provide an
explanation. One might think that this entails that philosophers should abandon attempts to
provide a unified account of explanation; i.e. they should adopt the other horn of Pincock’s
dilemma. However, in the next section, we argue that a unified account can still be provided that
accommodates explanatory pluralism.

4. Explanation as a Cluster Concept
Given that the concept of explanation is central to scientific practice, philosophers have long
sought to provide a unified account of scientific explanation (Salmon 1989). However, as we saw
in Section 2, scientists explain phenomena in very different ways. A common response has been
to try to identify a set of necessary features that could unify all explanations. However, as we
argued in Section 3, none of the features identified by extant accounts are necessary for all
explanations. This raises the worry that it may not be possible to provide a unified account of
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There is a crucial difference here between arguing that explanations can involve essential idealizations and
suggesting that explanations need not involve any truths. We argue only that it is not necessary for an explanation to
contain only true statements. Moreover, we address the possibility that all explanations must involve some truth in
Section 5.2.
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explanation. Hence, philosophers of science have recently focused more on demarcating
different kinds of explanations from one another (Ariew et al. 2015; Bokulich 2012; Lange 2012,
2013; Sober 1983; Walsh et al. 2002). In contrast, we argue that a unified account of explanation
can still be provided, but to do so we must move beyond attempting to find necessary features of
all explanations. This can be accomplished, we argue, by reconceiving of scientific explanation
as a cluster concept: there are multiple subsets of features that are sufficient for providing an
explanation, but no single feature is necessary for all explanations. In support of this view, we
argue that reconceiving of explanation as a cluster concept accommodates the diversity of kinds
of explanation, accounts for the widespread disagreement in the explanation literature, and
enables explanatory pluralism to avoid Pincock’s dilemma.
If explanation is a cluster concept then there ought to be a set of features, several
overlapping subsets of which are sufficient to explain, but none of which are necessary for all
explanations. We think the various accounts of explanation from the last 70 years (surveyed in
Section 2) give us a robust start for formulating this list of features. Moreover, these various
accounts of scientific explanation have shown that various subsets of these features are sufficient
to provide different kinds of explanation. Finally, while we have argued that none of these
features are necessary for all explanations, the subsets of sufficient features have significant
overlap. We summarize these results in the table below.
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As this table illustrates, various overlapping features can connect diverse members of the family
of explanations. In fact, every kind of explanation shares at least some features with at least one
other kind of explanation. Therefore, while there are no necessary features common to every
explanation, every kind of explanation is connected via certain resemblances with other members
of the family. For example, providing counterfactual dependence information is common to
many forms of explanation. Similarly, truth and accuracy is common to many kinds of
explanation. In addition, describing a temporal order of events connects causal and mechanical
forms of explanation. What this shows is that the sufficient subsets for explanation overlap in
significant ways that enable us to discover connections between different kinds of explanation.
Despite the diversity of features and kinds of explanation, reconceiving of explanation as a
cluster concept enables us to recognize these significant overlaps and maintain a unified concept
of explanation without having to discover necessary features of all explanations.
Conceiving of explanation as a cluster concept also enables us to provide an account of
what makes explanations epistemically valuable to scientists. In particular, explanations are
epistemically valuable because they have some subset of the features in the list above. For
example, having a causal explanation is valuable because it describes the causes of the
explanandum, describes relationships of counterfactual dependence, describes how a temporal
21

order of events unfolds, and is true of the causal structure of the world. However, while all
explanations are epistemically valuable because they provide information that scientists desire,
the source of that value will be different for different kinds of explanation. For example, a
statistical explanation will be valuable because it describes statistical properties, describes
statistical laws, describes counterfactual dependencies, and these features are true of the systems
in which the explanandum occurs. Ultimately the reason these kinds of information are valuable
is because they are valuable to practicing scientists who have different interests and goals
(Woody 2015).17 In short, the reason explanations are valuable is not because they all provide the
same types of information, but because the different types of information they provide are able to
satisfy the varying interest of practicing scientists.
Our approach abandons the long history of philosophical attempts to analyze the concept
of explanation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. However, proposing that
explanation is a cluster concept is not to abandon the project of trying to analyze the concept.
Instead, cluster concepts provide some rules about how the concept can be appropriately
applied—they simply allow that the same concept can be appropriately applied in several
overlapping ways (Pigliucci 2003). As Wittgenstein puts it: “We can draw a boundary for a
special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all!’’ (PI §69). For
example, Wittgenstein argues that while some things are games and some are not, this is
consistent with there being indeterminacy about precisely where those boundaries are. In other
words, concepts can still be usable even if their boundaries do not have the precision provided by

17

An anonymous reviewer suggested that perhaps a necessary feature of all explanations is that they provide
information about the world. However, we think this feature is insufficient to distinguish explanations from nonexplanations. After all, many things provide information about the world without explaining. Moreover, we think it
is important to recognize that the reason explanations are valuable is because they provide the kinds of information
about the world that are valuable to scientists—i.e. explanations are valuable because scientists find them valuable
not just because they provide information.
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necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g. heaps and baldness). What is more, we suggest that this
lack of precision of the boundaries of the concept accounts for the widespread disagreement
found in the explanation literature. As we saw in Section 2, the philosophical literature on
explanation has resulted in numerous accounts of explanation that are seemingly incompatible
with each other. Moreover, because these accounts have proposed necessary and sufficient
conditions, the literature on explanation also contains an ever-expanding set of counterexamples
to the proposed universal accounts. This proliferation of counterexamples is precisely what one
would expect if none of the features of explanations are necessary for all explanations. Because
no feature is necessary, there will always be a counterexample to any proposed necessary
condition. Moreover, given that there are multiple sufficient subsets for explanations, in many
cases we should not expect these disagreements to be resolved. After all, defenders of different
accounts, or counterexamples to those accounts, will often simply be making use of different
subsets of sufficient features. Consequently, our account can explain the vast and heated
disagreement in the philosophy of science literature on explanation.18 What is more, our account
points to a way to move the discussion of scientific explanation beyond these intractable
disagreements. Reconceiving of explanation as a cluster concept would encourage philosophers
of science to focus on identifying a range of sufficient types of explanation, where those types of
explanation are typically found, as well as identifying what different kinds of explanation might
have in common. Moreover, by identifying new kinds of explanation, we can expand the list of
features that unify the family of explanations together.

18

Moreover, if our account is correct, then we can provide an explanation for why the psychology of explanation
literature suggests that there are multiple concepts of explanation employed in our everyday reasoning (Columbo
2017). That different philosophical theories of explanation all track some cases of our judgments of explanatory
power is just what one would expect if explanation is a cluster concept.

23

Conceiving of explanation as a cluster concept also shows a way for explanatory
pluralists to avoid Pincock’s dilemma. Recall that Pincock’s dilemma is that either the pluralist
needs to abandon any attempt to provide a unified account of explanation, or they must identify
unifying features, which seems incompatible with genuine pluralism about explanation. Instead
of adopting either of the horns of this dilemma, we have argued that a unified account of
explanation can be provided without having to identify necessary features that all explanations
have in common. This is accomplished by recognizing that a unified account is obtainable
without referencing any particular feature as necessary or common to all instances. What unifies
these diverse cases under the moniker of ‘scientific explanation’ are the various overlapping
features or resemblances between members of the family of explanations found in science. Like
other possible applications of cluster concepts (e.g. species), this enables us to account for the
diversity of features of individual members of the family, while maintaining that the connections
between them are able to distinguish them from nonmembers. That is, rather than just having a
few minor connections between family members, the substantial overlap of many features of the
members is robust enough to make normative application of the concept possible. In this way,
reconceiving of explanation as a cluster concept allows us to recognize the myriad different ways
that scientists explain and yet maintain a unified account of scientific explanation.

5. Objections and Replies
5.1. Ruling Out Nonexplanations
One possible objection to thinking of explanation as a cluster concept is that the concept might
be so inclusive that it allows in typical cases of intuitively nonexplanations. However, this is not
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the case. To propose that explanation is a cluster concept is only to suggest that there are
multiple overlapping sufficient subsets of features none of which are necessary. This is
compatible with several purported cases failing to meet any of the sufficient subsets of features.
Moreover, purported accounts of explanation might be wrong about the sufficiency of the
conditions they cite and the cluster concept should be refined accordingly. For example, cases
like the flagpole or hexed salt showed that meeting Hempel’s list of conditions was insufficient
for providing an explanation. Furthermore, these cases fail to meet all the other proposed sets of
sufficient conditions as well. Therefore, these cases show that a cluster concept can still be used
to demarcate genuine explanations from nonexplanations. Interestingly, most of the explanation
literature has focused on demonstrating that a particular set of criteria is not necessary for
providing an explanation. However, we have argued that the counterexamples from the
explanation literature suggest that no feature is necessary for all scientific explanations. As a
result, we contend that the analysis of scientific explanation should shift its focus to the subsets
of conditions that purport to be sufficient for scientific explanation in order to determine if they
really are sufficient on their own. Doing so will help us refine our proposed reformulation of
explanation as a cluster concept and help us discover if particular instances are, in fact, genuine
explanations or nonexplanantions.
5.2. Necessary Features of All Explanations are Cheap
Another possible objection is that, of course there are several features that all explanations have
in common that might be cited as necessary features for being a scientific explanation. For
example, one might suggest that all explanations are answers to why questions (van Fraassen
1980). After all, what distinguishes explanations is that they show us why the explanandum
occurred. In addition, one might point out that all explanations involve some true statements.
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However, while many features will be common to all explanations, citing such generic features
as necessary conditions provides little in terms of an account of what makes something an
explanation. That is, whatever set of trivial features might be common to all explanations will be
insufficient to generate anything like a normative account of the nature of scientific explanation
that could help us understand why explanations are epistemically valuable. This is precisely why
our account builds on the sets of sufficient conditions already identified by extant accounts of
explanation. These accounts can provide normative guidance for practicing scientists and enable
us to distinguish between different kinds of explanation. It is only by incorporating the more
specific features of various kinds of explanation that we get a more robust account of what
enables the features cited in the explanans to explain why the explanandum occurred.
Another way to see why the features that all explanations have in common will be
insufficient to provide a satisfactory account of explanation is to consider what Andrea Woody
(2015) calls the functional role of explanations in science. Woody argues that the epistemic value
of explanations is captured by their playing a particular functional role: they contribute to
advancing the research programs they are part of by organizing (or structuring) the way in which
those research programs ought to be pursued. In particular, Woody argues that “Explanatory
theories are ones from which scientists can develop rich explanatory practices that effectively
establish communal norms for reasoning that in turn facilitate achievement of the community’s
cognitive and epistemic aims” (Woody 2015, 86).19 We agree that any account of explanation
ought to be able to account for this functional role of explanation in scientific practice. Indeed,
accounting for this role is crucial to showing why explanations are epistemically valuable to
scientists. The common features discussed above, however, fail to do this. For example, merely
For example, Woody suggests that explanation “enforces communal norms regarding what sorts of information
are to be considered intelligible and enlightening and the types of reasoning that are legitimate within the
community” (Woody 2015, 86).
19
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saying that explanations involve some truths or that they answer why questions, fails to tell us
why (or how) explanations are particularly valuable to scientific practice.
5.3. How is the cluster concept account different from other pluralist proposals?
A final kind of objection suggests that other philosophers of science have already proposed
similar kinds of explanatory pluralism. First, as we noted above, both Pincock and Reutlinger
have argued that various kinds of explanation might be unified under a single account. For
Pincock this is accomplished by arguing that various kinds of explanation all involve some kind
of ontological dependence where the way the contrastive why question is asked determines
which of the ontological dependence relations ought to be appealed to in the explanation
(Pincock 2018). The key point, for Pincock, is that by contrasting the explanandum in different
ways, we can avoid having to claim that there are multiple dependence relations that explain the
same fact, which would generate an ‘overdetermination problem’ for ontic accounts that appeal
to dependence relations in the world. Instead of having multiple dependence relations explain the
same explanandum, Pincock suggests that different dependence relations will be suited to answer
different contrastive questions (Pincock 2018, 51).20 In sum, according to Pincock we can
accommodate explanatory pluralism by showing that all explanations must involve some kind of
dependence relation, but different dependence relations ought to be used in order to answer
different contrastive why questions.
While we agree with Pincock that the way in which the why question is asked and
contrasted will greatly influence the kind of explanation that ought to be provided in a particular

For example, Pincock argues that “when a contrast is tied to a difference that could have been made through
causes changing events, while fixing the constitutive character and the broader abstract structure, then a causal
explanation in mandated…when a contrast invokes a difference between types of systems, then only an abstract
explanation will cite the right kind of factor that is responsible for those differences across systems. Looking at the
operations of causes or the internal constitution of the elements of the actual system will fail to make sense of that
sort of contrast” (Pincock 2018, 51-52).
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context, we think merely appealing to dependence relations fails to provide an adequate account
of what explanations are and why they are valuable. Indeed, in many ways the key question
regarding explanations is precisely which dependence relations can be used to explain and why
uncovering those dependence relations is valuable to scientists. We contend that it is in virtue of
their ability to satisfy a sufficient subset of the criteria involved in our cluster concept that shows
why various kinds of dependence relations are able to provide explanations. That is, merely
appealing to the fact that all explanations involve dependence relations is too thin to provide a
complete account of explanation that could provide normative guidance and capture what is
distinctively valuable about explanations.21 In contrast, by revealing the various subsets of
features that different kinds of explanations (i.e. those that appeal to different dependence
relations) are able to provide, the cluster concept account fills in what distinguishes explanations
and makes them particularly valuable.
In a similar way, following Bokulich (2012), Rice (2015), and Saatsi and Pexton (2013),
Reultinger (2016, 2018) argues that multiple kinds of explanations can all be subsumed under a
counterfactual account of explanation. While we are sympathetic with this approach’s attempts
to unify causal and noncausal explanations by appealing to counterfactual dependence, as we
argued above there will be cases where the features appealed to in the explanans are features on
which the explanandum does not counterfactually depend. Another problem with Reutlinger’s
monistic account is that he suggests that all explanations must appeal to ‘nomic generalizations’
(Reutlinger 2018, 79), but we have argued that such appeals to law-like regularities are not
necessary for all explanations. Finally, Reutlinger argues that all the generalizations and
conditions appealed to in an explanation must be veridical or true (Reutlinger 2018, 79).

There is, of course, much more to Pincock’s account of explanation. However, our focus here is on the feature he
proposes as being the unifying feature of all explanations.
21
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However, this necessary condition fails to hold in cases where essential idealizations play a role
within the explanation (Batterman 2002; Batterman and Rice 2014; Khalifa et al. forthcoming;
Morrison 2015). In short, Reutlinger’s account cannot accommodate instances where falsehoods
play essential and ineliminable roles within the explanation; e.g. the essential use of the
thermodynamic limit in renormalization explanations.22 Reutlinger responds to this challenge by
suggesting that idealized explanations can be covered by a minimalist account of idealization
(e.g. that proposed by Strevens 2008) in which idealizations distort non-difference-making (i.e.
irrelevant) features (Reutlinger 2018, 80). However, there are many explanations, such as the
renormalization group explanation described above, in which the idealizations play essential
roles within the explanation and cannot be restricted to the distortion of irrelevant factors
(Batterman 2002; Rice 2017, 2018). In these cases, features of the system that are known to
make a difference and on which the explanandum counterfactually depends are distorted within
the explanans. Consequently, there are several cases of explanation that cannot be
accommodated by Reutlinger’s veridicality condition even if we adopt a minimalist account of
idealization. In sum, we think the arguments given above show that at least three of the
conditions involved in Reutlinger’s account are not necessary for all explanations.
Next, our account agrees with Woody (2015) that an account of explanation ought to
capture the functional role that explanations play that makes them epistemically valuable to the
practice of science. Moreover, like Woody, we have argued that looking to scientific practice
reveals extreme heterogeneity with respect to the ways that scientists explain. We also think our
account provides many of the same virtues Woody claims for the functional perspective; e.g. a
22

While Reutlinger (2016) argues that his account can accommodate RG explanations, we think his presentation of
that case rests on a misunderstanding of the crucial role played by the thermodynamic limit in allowing the
renormalization transformation to arrive at a fixed point which enables physicists to identify the critical exponents
that are essential to explaining the universality of the critical behaviors we observe. Rather than working through
those details here, we refer interested readers to Batterman (2002, 2010) and Morrison (2009, 2015).
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focus on actual scientific practice, the ability to accommodate explanatory pluralism, the ability
to account for the explanatory status of idealized models, and the ability to salvage various
insights from the existing explanation literature.23 However, while Woody argues that we need to
consider how explanations contribute to the aims of scientific practice, she does not offer this as
a unifying account of what distinguishes explanations from nonexplanations. Indeed, as Woody
notes, “Even if one adopts the functional perspective, there is still a significant project
characterizing the adequacy conditions applied to particular explanations in particular contexts.”
(Woody 2015, 86). We think our account of explanation as a cluster concept does precisely this:
it analyzes the similarities and differences of the adequacy conditions used across different cases
from scientific practice. Filling in these details also seems to help address some of the concerns
Woody raises for the functional perspective; e.g. the inability to judge which explanations are
adequate or the difficulty of distinguishing explanations from nonexplanations. In particular, our
account of explanation as a cluster concept fills in additional details about precisely which aims
of scientific practice different kinds of explanations are able to contribute to. In sum, we think
our approach is consistent with Woody’s functional perspective, but is distinct in aiming to
provide a unified account of explanation that can accommodate the plurality of ways that
scientists explain, demarcate explanations from nonexplanations, and provide additional details
about why explanations are valuable to practicing scientists.
Finally, Eric Hochstein has admirably tried to make sense of the disagreements in the
explanation literature by distinguishing several different goals of explanation and arguing that
the disagreements result from different authors focusing on different goals. In light of these
different goals, Hochstein’s main thesis is that, “Given that no one model can satisfy all the goals
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We also think our account connects explanations with understanding; e.g. see Rohwer and Rice 2016 for a more
detailed discussion of those connections.
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typically associated with explanation, no one model in isolation can provide a good scientific
explanation of a complex phenomenon” (Hochstein 2017, 1107). As a result, Hochstein argues
that, “Collections of models provide an explanation when they satisfy the web of interconnected
goals” (Hochstein 2017, 1122).
While both Hochstein and we lay out various features of different types of scientific
explanation, the view we adopt in response to the diversity of those goals is very different. First,
where Hochstein explicitly rejects that satisfying a subset of these goals is sufficient to explain,
we explicitly adopt this kind of pluralism and have tried to show how it can be made compatible
with providing a universal account of what makes explanations distinct and valuable. However,
unlike Hochstein’s description of pluralism, we do not think that the pluralist is required to
“determine a clear victor between conflicting explanatory goals so as to grant one model or
another the status of an explanation” (Hochstein 2017, 1115). Instead, the kind of pluralism we
embrace allows that there will often be multiple sufficient explanations for the same
phenomenon where no one of the explanations should be declared the ‘victor’.
Second, where Hochstein argues that no single model can provide an explanation (2017,
1120), we contend that many single models are sufficient to explain because the information they
provide will satisfy a sufficient subset of the conditions included in the cluster concept. Indeed,
many of the examples provided above involve single models that are able to provide sufficient
explanations. Whereas Hochstein’s account would require us to radically reconceive of each of
these cases as failing to explain without additional models that could satisfy other goals (e.g.
describing mechanisms), we think these models are sufficient to explain on their own—even if
other models are required to achieve other explanatory goals or provide different explanations.
As a way of clarifying this crucial difference, consider Hochstein’s claim that no explanation can

31

be provided unless one of the models involved is able to describe the “physical mechanisms that
generate and sustain the target phenomenon” (Hochstein 2017, 1106). We disagree. In contrast,
we think many (individual) models are able to provide scientific explanations without requiring
that they, or some other model, satisfy all the other goals on Hochstein’s list; e.g. describing the
mechanisms that gave rise to the phenomenon. While mechanistic explanation is certainly one
form of explanation, as we have argued above, describing a mechanism is not necessary to
explain.
This draws out the starkest contrast between our view and the view defended by
Hochstein. Where Hochstein argues that it is necessary for a collection of models to satisfy all of
the goals he thinks are traditionally associated with explanations in order to explain, we have
argued that none of the conditions traditionally associated with explanation are necessary. For
example, Hochstein’s view requires that all explanations must describe mechanisms and enable
for manipulation and control.24 In contrast, we do not think that all explanations must accomplish
these goals in order to be successful (see Ariew et al. 2015; Batterman and Rice 2014; Huneman
2010; Morrison 2015; Pincock 2012, 2018; Rice 2012, 2015, 2017 or Sober 1983 for some
examples). Instead of requiring the use of multiple models to satisfy all of these criteria before
we can claim that an explanation has been provided, we have argued that in different cases
different subsets of features will be sufficient to provide an explanation.
These differences between our view and Hochstein’s also have important implications for
how we ought to evaluate the explanatory successes of science. Given that in many cases we will
lack models that can satisfy some of the explanatory goals on Hochstein’s list—e.g. in many
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We actually think that Hochstein is committed to a kind of monism in that he argues that all explanations must
satisfy the same criteria despite arguing that no single goal is most important. In other words, Hochstein seems to
reject the explanatory pluralism that we aim to account for that claims that there are multiple different kinds of
explanation provided in science.
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cases, no mechanistic model exists for a complex phenomenon—Hochstein’s view implies that
science has provided far fewer explanations than scientists have claimed. In contrast, our view
has focused on the plurality of ways that scientists explain phenomena and shows how, despite
that plurality, each of those explanations can be shown to be sufficient and valuable in their own
right. Thus, rather than suggesting, as Hochstein (2017) does, that science cannot explain without
simultaneously conveying understanding, showing the phenomenon was expected, identifying
general principles, identifying physical mechanisms, and enabling manipulation and control, we
contend that the diverse range of explanations surveyed above shows that scientists have
successfully explained in many different ways despite failing to satisfy many of the criteria of
explanations in any particular case. This is precisely why a cluster concept is required: without it
we are back to suggesting that a certain set of features are necessary and sufficient for all
explanations in ways that fail to do justice to the plurality of ways that scientists explain.

6. Conclusion
We have argued that we can resurrect the goal of attempting to provide a unified account of
explanation by reconceiving of explanation as a cluster concept. In order to motivate this claim,
we have argued that, while there are multiple overlapping sufficient subsets of features, no single
feature is necessary for all explanations. On the one hand, any features that are common to all
explanations will be too uninformative to provide a normative account of how explanations
ought to be provided and why explanations are epistemically valuable. On the other hand, any set
of conditions that are sufficient to normatively guide the construction of explanations and
account for explanations’ epistemic value will not be necessary for all explanations. Abandoning
the search for necessary conditions for all explanations and reconceiving of explanation as a
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cluster concept enables us to move beyond the never-ending cycle of proposing universal
accounts and counterexamples to those accounts. Consequently, our analysis implies that instead
of using counterexamples to demonstrate that certain features are not necessary for explanations,
philosophers need to investigate whether particular subsets of features are genuinely sufficient
for providing an explanation. In addition, we have argued that conceiving of explanation as a
cluster concept enables us to account for the widespread disagreement observed in the
philosophical literature on explanation. Moreover, we have shown that a cluster concept
approach to explanation can avoid the dilemma Pincock raises for explanatory pluralism by
maintaining a unified concept of explanation while still recognizing the myriad ways scientists
provide explanations. If these arguments are successful concerning the concept of explanation,
then a cluster concept approach might be useful in other philosophical debates where a similar
tension arises between the hope of discovering a universal account of concept X and recognizing
the diversity of ways that concept X is used. That is, perhaps additional philosophical debates
can benefit from less of a focus on identifying necessary conditions for all applications of a
concept.
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